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Downsizing is an organizational activity designed to purposefully reduce the size 
of the organization by eliminating positions and jobs (Cascio, 1993:96).  This business 
strategy has been used for many years in both the public and private sectors and is 
expected to continue.  Downsizing has been shown to have an affect on the employees 
the organization retains, often termed survivors, and has been linked to increased 
turnover and decreased productivity and effectiveness.  With the expected continuation of 
downsizing actions in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the possible affective 
reactions experienced by survivors, the intent of this research is to identify the effect 
downsizing has on attrition rates of military personnel to provide insight to leadership in 
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Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed 
to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except 
twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard 
the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number 
of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain. 
Resolution of the Continental Congress; Disbanding 
the Continental Army, 2 June 1784 (Department of the Army, 
1992:Ch 6, 0) 
 
Chapter Overview 
Downsizing is an organizational activity designed to purposefully reduce the size 
of an organization by eliminating positions and jobs (Cascio, 1993:96).  This business 
strategy has been used in both the public and private sectors for many years and is 
expected to continue.  The long standing usage of downsizing is evidenced in the opening 
quotation of this chapter where the Continental Congress disbanded the Continental 
Army after the Revolutionary War.  In the recent past, research on this organizational 
strategy has been plentiful and indicates that downsizing has been shown to have an 
affect on the employees the organization retains, often termed survivors, and has been 
linked to increased turnover and decreased productivity and effectiveness.   
With the expected continuation of downsizing actions in the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and the possible affective reactions experienced by survivors, the intent 
of this research is to identify the effect downsizing has on attrition rates of military 
personnel to provide insight to leadership in their decision making process when 
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considering downsizing actions across the DoD.  This chapter provides a recent 
background on downsizing, a discussion of the research purpose, and a brief discussion 
on the methodology for this research effort.   
 
Recent Downsizing Background 
 
During the troubled economic times of the 1980s and early 1990s, many civilian 
organizations implemented downsizing as a way of reducing costs (Clair and Dufresne, 
2004:1597).  In fact, AT&T implemented an incentive plan in 1989 to eliminate 12,000 
jobs, an action that resulted in an estimated $450 million in savings per year (Dichter and 
Trank, 1991:40).  Other companies showed the same interest in downsizing and realized 
similar financial gains.  In the early 1990s, after comparing itself to other international 
chemical companies, Du Pont decided it needed to reduce costs by one billion dollars 
(Cascio, 1993:96).  The cost reductions came partly from an elimination of 2,500 white-
collar jobs from its fibers business and another 20% from in-house engineering (Cascio, 
1993:96).   
Downsizing has also been used to restructure organizations to gain efficiencies or 
competitiveness (Cameron, 1994:192).  In 2006, Ford Motor Company announced that its 
restructuring plan would include closing ten plants and cutting 25,000 hourly jobs, with 
an ultimate goal of gaining efficiencies to increase capacity utilization, expand into new 
markets, and to increase their diminishing market share (Hoffman, 2006:para 1).  Another 
example of such a downsizing purpose occurred following the end of the Cold War where 
military manning in the DoD decreased by over 700,000, or 33%, and civilian DoD 
employees decreased by over 300,000, or 37% (Zamparelli, 1999:13).  Prior to the end of 
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the Cold War, the DoD was sized to simultaneously fight and win two major wars on two 
fronts.  After the Cold War, however, the environment changed to smaller, more regional 
threats (Schwan, 1995:1)  This redefinition triggered the need for a smaller force (DoD-a, 
2006:V-7).   
The trend of downsizing is expected to continue in the DoD, this time however, 
with shrinking budgets and the need for replacement of weapons systems, the purpose 
appears to be cost savings.  In fact, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 
indicates the DoD will continue to downsize, with the Air Force expecting to lose an 
additional 40,000 positions in the next five years (DoD-b, 2006:47).  
Many researchers have explored the affective reactions of survivors following a 
downsizing action.  Devin, Reay, Stainton, and Collins-Nakai (2003:10) found survivors 
experience feelings of anger, depression, fear, distrust, and guilt.  Moreover, these 
feelings have been linked to several emotional outcomes that include reduced 
organizational commitment and increased turnover intentions (Spreitzer and Mishra, 
2002:719-721).  Other factors, such as role overload and lack of role clarity, can be 
present after a downsizing action and can lead to the same emotional outcomes of 
decreased organizational attachment and increased turnover intentions (Allen, Freeman, 
Russell, Reizenstein, and Rentz, 2001:149).  While downsizing is meant to purposefully 
reduce the size of an organization, the dysfunctional or unplanned turnover of those the 
organization wishes to retain can harm the organization’s productivity and effectiveness 
(Abelson and Baysinger, 1984:331; Cascio, 1993:99-100).   Additionally, turnover costs 
for employees who leave the organization can be substantial; in fact, estimates can be as 
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high as $186,000 (inflated to 2005 dollars) per employee (Klewer, Shaffer, and Binnig, 
1995:12).  Moreover, though some organizations downsize as a managerial strategy to 
help reduce costs and increase productivity, most organizations experience the opposite 
effect (West, 2000:7).   
 
Research Purpose  
Because downsizing is expected to continue in the DoD (DoD-b, 2006:47), this 
research will analyze the effect downsizing has on the attrition rates of military personnel 
in the years following a downsizing action.  Specifically, this research will analyze 
attrition rates and military end strengths by fiscal year to determine whether, in the years 
following a downsizing action, attrition rates will increase.  The question will be 
addressed for the overall DoD and each branch of service to compare differences based 




To complete the proposed research in the DoD setting, authorizations, end-
strengths, and attrition rates, by service and grade, were retrieved from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  Data for control variables used in the analysis were 
retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Military Officer Association of 
America (MOAA), and Public Affairs and research offices for the services.  A panel 
regression analysis was performed on this data to determine the effects of downsizing on 






 As discussed, downsizing has been used as a business strategy in both the public 
and private sectors for many years and is expected to continue.  Downsizing has been 
linked to increased dysfunctional turnover and such unexpected turnover can cost 
organizations substantial dollars.  Because of the possibility of unexpected turnover in the 
DoD based on its downsizing decisions, as well as the large costs of such unexpected 
turnover, this research is intended to identify the effect downsizing has on future attrition 
rates of military personnel.  To accomplish this task, this paper will continue with a 
review of related literature, followed by a more detailed discussion of the methodology 
and a presentation of the data, an interpretation of the results, and a conclusion to 


























II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
The literature on downsizing is plentiful, ranging from unsupported advice on 
how to downsize to empirical studies on organizations that have downsized.  Since the 
purpose of this research is to study the effect downsizing has on attrition rates of military 
personnel in the years following a downsizing action, this chapter will give an overview 
of the downsizing literature with a brief discussion on why firms downsize, followed by a 
focus on the implications of downsizing on survivors and the organization, a section on 
the effects of downsizing in a military setting, and a discussion regarding how this 
research is linked to the civilian sector.   
Why Organizations Downsize 
Downsizing is thought to reduce costs, improve efficiencies, and improve 
competitiveness (De Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden, and Roraff, 2004:156).  Because 
of this, it has been used as a business strategy for many years (Lurie, 1998:6-7).  Prior to 
the late 1980s, downsizing was used primarily as a response to survive an economic crisis 
(Gandolfi and Neck, 2003:16; Lurie, 1998:7).  In the 1990s, however, companies who 
were financially strong were also downsizing (Lurie, 1998:6).  Downsizing in profitable 
firms can perhaps be explained because organizational downsizing is said to have a 
positive impact on the firm’s financial performance by eliminating inefficient processes 
and reducing labor costs (De Meuse and others, 2004:158).  Moreover, it is commonly 
thought that the firm will increase its profitability by implementing a downsizing strategy 
even if the firm is already profitable.    
 6
 
Empirical results in the literature, however, seem to be inconsistent on this ruling. 
Studies have shown that increases in financial performance are not always enjoyed by 
firms that downsize.  In 1998, for example, Cascio found that several companies’ 
financial performance in the Standard and Poor’s 500 did not appear to change 
dramatically, positively or negatively, based on downsizing actions (Cascio, 1998:69).  In 
another study, results showed “the market generally viewed downsizing actions 
negatively because of concerns that losses from human capital will exceed the benefits 
gained from lower costs” (Nixon, Hitt, Lee, and Jeong, 2004:1128).  Yet another study 
found that while company performance was worse in the two years following a 
downsizing, long term performance was likely to improve beginning in the third year 
(DeMeuse and others 2004:172).   
Even with inconsistent financial performance results, downsizing has become part 
of corporate culture and organizations continue to downsize.  The Department of Defense 
(DoD) is no different.  The organization has reduced its manpower by more than 33% 
since the end of the Cold War (Zamparelli, 1999:13) and it is continuing to use 
downsizing as a business strategy.  DoD leaders are currently motivated to apply this 
strategy because there is a need to transform the services due to changing threats and 
fewer dollars available for modernization (DoD-b, 2006:V-7).  As shown in Figure 1, 
some researchers believe the reduction in dollars available for modernization, aging 
equipment, and rising operations and maintenance costs are requiring the DoD to utilize 
money-saving strategies in order to avoid a decline in future readiness (Anderson, 
McGuiness, and Spicer 2002:93).  As discussed in the 2006 Quadrennial Review Report 
(QDR), downsizing appears to be one of the ways the DoD is going to realize these 
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savings to redirect resources for modernization (DoD-b, 2006:V-7).  Table 1 shows the 
expected outlays by appropriation in the DoD for 2006 and 2007 (other specific 
appropriations by year are not yet available).  As shown, there is an expected decrease in 
personnel outlays from 2006 to 2007, with an accompanying increase in procurement and 
research, development, test, and evaluation dollars.  
   
Figure 1.  DoD Readiness Death Spiral.  
(Anderson and others, 2002:93). 
 
 
Table 1.  Outlays by Function and Subfunction 
Outlays by Function and Subfunction 
  2006 2007 
 Military Personnel  116,346 109,892  
 Operation and Maintenance 192,563 161,514  
 Procurement  88,754 89,734  
 Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation 70,766 72,112  
 Military Construction  7,322 8,326  
 Family Housing  3,824 3,868  
 Anticipated funding for Global War on Terror  30,058 55,882  
 Other  2,420 3,526  
  514,059 504,854  
Shown in millions; Estimates of outlays for 2006 and 2007 
Source:  Office of Management and Budget, 2007:60 
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Implications of Downsizing 
When coupled with downsizing’s inconsistent financial performance results, there 
may be longer term organizational issues that arise because of the possible negative 
effects on the survivors left in the organization (Cascio, 1993:99-100; Palmer, Kabanoff, 
and Dunford, 1997:623-624).  These effects have been studied by many researchers and 
evidence shows that survivors may experience increased anxiety and stress, and 
decreased organizational commitment, morale, motivation, and productivity (Allen and 
others, 2001:148-149; Cascio, 1993:99-101; Godkin, Valentine, and St. Pierre, 2002:66; 
Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:719-721).  Research also shows that these reactions are linked 
to decreased attachment and an increased intent to turnover (Allen and others, 2001:148-
149; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:719-721).   Furthermore, such turnover can cost an 
organization thousands per employee (Darmon, 1990:53; Klewer, Shaffer, and Binnig, 
1995:12).   
Mishra and Spreitzer (1998:572-573) developed a theoretical framework to 
explain survivor reactions.  This framework posits that when survivors appraise 
downsizing as a threat, where their perceptions indicate the downsizing action is unfair, 
their reactions are less positive.  This can be countered by helping the individuals cope 
with the downsizing, through empowerment and work redesign initiatives. (Mishra and 
Spreitzer, 1998:572-573).  Spreitzer and Mishra (2002: 710) tested this framework 
empirically, showing predictors of survivor attachment as trustworthiness of 
management, empowerment, and justice.  These levels of attachment were significantly 
related to actual turnover (Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:719-721).   
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In a similar study, Allen and others applied work role transition theory to explain 
survivor reactions over time (2001:147).  Work role transition can be described as 
changes in position requirements or context such as job redesign, change of boss or co-
workers, or inter and intra-organizational mobility (Allen and others, 2001:147).  Though 
work role transitions such as job redesign can be positive based on the perception of the 
survivor (Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:714), role overload and lack of role clarity that may 
accompany the redesigns in a downsizing setting can have a negative effect (Allen and 
others, 2001:149).  By measuring variables such as role clarity, role overload, job 
involvement, satisfaction with top management, and satisfaction with job security, Allen 
and others found that employee attitudes were less favorable and that such attitudes 
related to a higher intent to turnover in the time immediately following a downsizing 
(2001:159).   
If the employee does in fact decide to leave the firm, turnover costs can be very 
expensive for the organization.  In a study published by Darmon, it was shown that costs 
related to turnover can include exit interviews, severance pay, recruiting, training, 
differential operating costs, and differential skill costs (1990:48).  Additionally, it was 
estimated that turnover costs the company $75,000 per employee (inflated to 2005 
dollars).  Estimates of turnover costs will vary based on factors such as position and skill 
level required, and other literature suggests that turnover costs can be as high as $186,000 
per employee (inflated to 2005 dollars) (Klewer and others, 1995:12).   
In sum, the research has suggested that downsizing creates a greater level of 
disenchantment among employees and these employees consider leaving the 
organization.  Indeed, such intentions to turnover have been shown to be a strong 
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predictor of actual turnover, though actual intent-behavior relationships vary widely 
across studies (Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner, 2000: 465-476).  Fortunately, when these 
intentions are triggered with a downsizing event, they may not persist.  Allen and others 
found that the period of increased turnover usually lasts approximately one year 
following the downsizing action, at which point survivor attitudes may begin returning to 
their pre-downsizing levels (2001:159).  Still, there is a period where organizations 
appear to lose quality employees that would otherwise be retained and risk thousands in 
turnover costs.    
 
Effects in a Military Setting 
 
Based on the theories that have been highlighted, it would be reasonable to think 
that military members might respond to downsizing experiences in a similar fashion.  
According to a recent survey, job security is the number two reason, preceded only by 
benefits, that federal employees plan to stay on their jobs (Gansler and Lucyshyn, 
2004:19).  With job security as a key prospect for federal employees, it is additional 
confirmation that similar survivor reactions could be expected.   
Other military challenges may alter the effects of downsizing in the DoD.  One of 
these challenges is the increase in the frequency of military deployments.  For example, 
in 1999, an average of 12,000 Airmen were deployed per day as compared to an average 
of 2,000 per day in 1989 (Zamparelli, 1999:13).  The frequency of these deployments 
increased, while strength levels in the Air Force, for example, decreased by 210,000 
during the same time (DoD-a, 2006:1).  Intuitively, a reduced force, coupled with more 
frequent deployments, may serve to complicate mission accomplishment because 
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commanders may be forced to multi-task their personnel in order to attempt to get the 
mission accomplished. Thus, survivors are left performing multiple and conflicting roles, 
often resulting in stress, burnout, and turnover (Rusaw, 2005:482).  Such work role 
transition issues experienced by the survivors that result from downsizing have been 
related to decreased organizational commitment and increased turnover intentions (Allen 
and others, 2001:149).   
While downsizing in the military has not been studied explicitly, other work role 
transition events, such as those brought on by outsourcing in the military, have been 
shown to reduce job satisfaction and ultimately correlate to an increase in turnover 
intentions (Kennedy, Holt, Ward, and Rehg, 2002:23).  Additionally, replenishment of 
trained personnel could also be a problem in that “legislative constraints often make it 
difficult to replace employees in a timely manner” (Kennedy and others, 2002:24).   
 
Link to Current Research 
The theories presented in the empirical research of civilian firms have been 
analyzed in the current research with an aggregate quantitative retrospective look at the 
DoD’s downsizing events and comparing those events to aggregate attrition rates in the 
years following the event.  Using the theories presented as a guide, it was expected that 
DoD reactions to downsizing would closely relate to those in the private sector.  It is 
important to note that besides issues related to replenishing the workforce, the DoD is 
different than the private sector in that military members incur service commitments.  
Civilian employees often have far more choices regarding the time they leave an 
organization.  In contrast, military members are obligated to serve a specified period of 
time where leaving may be prohibited.  As discussed previously, Allen and others found 
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that the increase in turnover following a downsizing lasts approximately one year and if 
the service member’s commitment requirement extends beyond this period, it may skew 
the results of this analysis by lowering the attrition rates.  Still, based on the possibility of 
the unplanned, or dysfunctional loss of human capital and its possible affects on mission 
accomplishment, effectiveness, productivity (Abelson and Baysinger, 1984; Rusaw, 
2005) and increased turnover costs (Darmon, 1990:53; Klewer and others, 1995:12), this 





This chapter has focused on the why firms downsize, the implications of 
downsizing, and the effects of downsizing in the military setting.  Since downsizing is 
expected to continue despite its questionable financial implications and effects on 
employees (Cascio, 1993:102; Palmer and others, 1997:623-624), the remainder of this 
paper will focus on answering the research question and attempt to determine the effect 
of downsizing on attrition rates in the DoD by discussing the methodology and data, the 
results of the empirical analysis of DoD’s past downsizing and attrition, followed by 













III. Data and Methodology 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the data and methodology used to answer the research 
question of how downsizing affects attrition rates in the DoD.  The discussion includes 
the sources of the data and how it was used in the analysis, control variables utilized, the 
pre-estimation stationarity test and model specification, and the limitations of this 
research.   
 
Data  
To complete the proposed research in the DoD setting, end-strengths and attrition 
rates were retrieved from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  Data for control 
variables used in the analysis were retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
the Military Officer Association of America (MOAA), and Public Affairs and research 
offices for the services.   
All data were gathered from 1974-2005.  Because the draft ended in 1973 
(Gullason, 1989:291), the analysis begins with 1974 to avoid skewing the results based 
on involuntary service and lack of attrition choices.  According to the DMDC, actual 
authorization rates, which more closely fit the definition of downsizing presented in 
Chapter One, were not available prior to 1996.   Attempts were made to collect such data 
from the services’ archives, but the data were also not available from those sources.  
Though actual authorizations would present more accurate analysis in tune with the 
definition of downsizing presented in Chapter One, only ten years of data could be 
analyzed.  As a result, end-strength levels from after the end of the draft, which were 
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available for 31 years, were used to determine downsizing events since they should 
closely mirror personnel authorizations provided by Congress.  Intuitively, the effects of 
a reduction in manpower would be similar regardless of the source of the reduction.   
Downsizing, therefore, was characterized in this analysis as the difference in the overall 
end-strength for the fiscal year in question from the previous fiscal year.   Attrition rates 
were defined as the number of personnel from each category who left the military in one 
year, divided by the total end strength at the end of the previous fiscal year.   
 
Control Variables 
To attempt to isolate the possible causation effects of downsizing on attrition 
rates, stop-loss, economic conditions, and additional military pay raises were used as 
control variables in this analysis.  This data was gathered from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), the Military Officer Association of America (MOAA), and Public Affairs and 
research offices for the services.   
Stop-loss is a program in the military where persons in specific job classifications 
(and at times, all job classifications), are prevented from leaving the military even if 
service commitments have been completed (Burgess, 2004: Para 2).  The authority for 
this program comes from Title 10 of United States Code, Section 12305 (U.S. Code 
Collection, 2006: Para a).   This program was generally implemented across the DoD 
during Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.  It is not until this program is lifted that people can be released from the military.   
The second control variable, economic conditions, was used to capture personnel 
who may choose to leave if they perceive better economic opportunities in the private 
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sector.  A measurement of the economy, called the “Misery Index” is being used in this 
analysis as a proxy for economic conditions.  The Misery Index is the sum of the 
unemployment and inflation rates as obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The 
final control variable, additional military pay raises, represents the delta between the  
military pay raise and average civilian pay raises as indicated by the Government’s 
annual employment cost index (ECI) for that year (all variables and their descriptions are 
shown in Table 2).   
Table 2.  Variable Information 
Variable 
Name Definition Variable Value Coefficient Meaning 
ATTR 
Attrition rate (ATTR):  
attrition numbers from 
the current year divided 
by the end strength from 
the previous year 
Positive means attrition 
rate goes up N/A (Dependent Variable) 
DZ 
Downsizing rate (DZ):  
(End strength current yr 
minus end strength 
previous yr) / by end 
strength previous yr 
Negative means the 
service downsized 
If negative, means as 
downsize, attrition rates go 
up 
Raise 
The difference between 
the military pay raise for 
that year and the 
Employment Cost Index 
(ECI) 
If positive, means the 
military got a higher pay 
raise 
If negative, means if 
military got higher raise, 
attrition rates go down 
SL 
Stop Loss (SL) program 
was implemented for the 
service for more than 
one quarter during the 
fiscal year 
Dummy variable-value 
of 1 if the program was 
implemented 
If negative, means if SL 
implemented, attrition 
rates go down 
Misery 
“Misery Index” :  The 
unemployment rate plus 
the inflation rate 
Unemployment rate is 
always positive; the 
overall index could be 
negative if inflation is 
more negative than 
unemployment; for this 
timeframe, the index 
was always positive 
If negative, means if the 
misery index goes up, 





Pre-Estimation Test and Model Specification 
The data was first tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) 
test.  Stationarity exists when the statistical properties of the data do not change over time 
(Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:324).  In time series, interpretation from 
analysis that uses non-stationary data can lead to spurious results and erroneous 
conclusions regarding relationships among the variables (Kennedy, 2003:319).  All 
datasets used in this analysis were stationary.  The results of the ADF are shown in 
Appendix B.   
A fixed effects panel model was used in the DoD overall analysis.  Panel analysis 
allows analysis to be performed with both cross-sectional units of observation and a 
temporal dimension (Yaffee, 2003:2).   Since the data includes each of the branches of 
service in the DoD, a fixed effects model was used because this type of model produces 
results conditional on the cross-sectional units under analysis, and that is what is relevant 
for this research (Kennedy, 2003:312).  Additionally, the fixed effects model was used 
because it is both effective at dealing with omitted variable bias and is robust to 
normality (Kennedy, 2003:304-307, 311-312).   
 
The representation of the model for this research is:  
ATTRit = αit +β1DZit + β2Raiseit + β3SLit + β4Miseryit + εit               (1) 
 
where      i = {Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps}, t = {1974, 1975…2005}, ATTR is 
attrition rates, DZ is the downsizing rate, Raise is the delta between the military pay raise 




The downsizing rate was lagged at periods of one and two years to determine how 
long the effects, if any, lasted.  Downsizing was lagged for one year to determine if the 
DoD follows the civilian sector in that reactions to downsizing return to normal in 
approximately one year (Allen and others, 2001:159).   A second year of lagged 
downsizing was used to attempt to capture the effect of a delay in attrition due to service 
commitments held by members.   Lagging the downsizing rate also alleviates the 
possibility of duplication in counting the loss of members in both the end-strength 
numbers used in the downsizing calculation and in the attrition rate for the same year. 
To further define the appropriate model specification to use in this analysis, the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was reviewed for several different preliminary 
regressions based on varying lag lengths of the variables and autoregressive (AR) 
specifications.  The AIC is a popular way of determining the goodness of fit of the model 
while maintaining parsimony (Makridakis and others, 1998:360; Kennedy, 2003:117).  
Smaller AICs indicate better fitting models.  The AICs from the analysis are shown 
below in Tables 3 and 4.  Since  stop-loss and the military pay raise delta from the EIC 
would intuitively garner more immediate effects, the AIC was reviewed only when 
lagging downsizing at one and two years, adding an AR term of one, two, and three, and 






Table 3.  Akaike Information Criteria (lagging downsizing on year) 
AR DZ Raise SL Misery AIC R2
1 1 0 0 0 -5.156107 0.824497 
1 1 0 0 1 -5.199011 0.831868 
1 1 0 0 2 -5.287868 0.817273 
1 1 0 0 3 -5.196848 0.785961 
2 1 0 0 0 -5.422236 0.843125 
2 1 0 0 1 -5.413939 0.841671 
2 1 0 0 2 -5.320706 0.814242 
2 1 0 0 3 -5.225314 0.794796 
3 1 0 0 0 -5.50429 0.848133 
3 1 0 0 1 -5.491408 0.846164 
3 1 0 0 2 -5.315219 0.815881 
3 1 0 0 3 -5.282801 0.800377 
 
 
Table 4.  Akaike Information Criteria (lagging downsizing two years) 
AR DZ Raise SL Misery AIC R2
1 2 0 0 0 -5.401149 0.836844 
1 2 0 0 1 -5.32031 0.823107 
1 2 0 0 2 -5.317446 0.822599 
1 2 0 0 3 -5.215537 0.789924 
2 2 0 0 0 -5.46481 0.839171 
2 2 0 0 1 -5.382943 0.825796 
2 2 0 0 2 -5.293025 0.809028 
2 2 0 0 3 -5.200373 0.789613 
3 2 0 0 0 -5.436078 0.836841 
3 2 0 0 1 -5.373958 0.826384 
3 2 0 0 2 -5.299356 0.812937 
3 2 0 0 3 -5.316377 0.806968 
 
Limitations 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the theories presented in the empirical research of 
civilian firms have been analyzed in the current research with an aggregate quantitative 
retrospective look at the DoD’s downsizing events and comparing those events to 
aggregate attrition rates in the years following the event.  By looking at the aggregate 
results of downsizing and attrition for the past 31 years, along with the control variables 
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of the military pay raise exceeding the ECI, whether or not stop-loss was implemented, 
and the economic conditions of the nation using the misery index, it is recognized that 
this aggregate study is unable to capture specific personal reasons for departing the 
military and cannot differentiate if the attrition numbers increased or decreased 
specifically because of downsizing.  However, while downsizing in the military and the 
resulting effect on attrition rates has not been studied explicitly, other work role transition 
events, such as those brought on by outsourcing in the military, have been empirically 
shown to reduce job satisfaction and ultimately correlate to an increase in turnover 
intentions.  Together with the empirical research of civilian firms indicating that 
downsizing appears to be correlated with subsequent attrition rates, it is believed using 
the selected methodology will offer insight into the effects of downsizing on attrition 
rates in the DoD.   
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter has provided the methodology and data used in this research.  In the 
following chapters, an interpretation of the results and a conclusion to summarize the 











This chapter discusses the results of the analysis for the overall DoD and each 
branch of service within the DoD.  As stated previously, fixed-effects panel regression 
analysis was performed.  The chapter follows with a discussion of the post-estimation 
tests and the results for the overall DoD and each of the services.   
 
Post-Estimation Tests  
To determine independence of the residuals in each model, the Durbin-Watson 
test statistic was calculated.  Lack of independence of residuals indicates autocorrelation 
in a model.  That is, the model is autocorrelated when the error term in one period is 
correlated with the error term in the previous time period (Salvatore and Reagle, 
2002:208).  If the model possesses autocorrelation, the model is subject to downward-
biased standard errors and incorrect statistical tests (Salvatore and Reagle, 2002:208).  
Autocorrelation can be corrected by adding an autoregressive (AR) specification term to 
the model estimates.  In each of the models, if autocorrelation was present, an appropriate 
AR term was added, as incorporated with the model specification information achieved 
from the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) discussed in the previous chapter. The 
Durbin-Watson results are shown with the model results later in this chapter.  The further 
away from two the Durbin-Watson test statistic is, the less certain that autocorrelation is 
not present; additionally, the critical values vary based on the number of observations and 
the number of independent variables used in the analysis.  A table indicating the Durbin-
Watson critical values and their definitions are shown in Appendix C. 
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Another important consideration in regression analysis is determining if the model 
has heteroskedasticity.  If a model is heteroskedastic, the assumption of the variance of 
the error term being constant is violated (Salvatore and Reagle, 2002:207).  If the error 
term is constant, the model is said to be homoscedastistic, which is the desired outcome.  
If a model is found to be heteroskedastic, this leads to unbiased, but inefficient estimates 
of the coefficients as well as biased estimates of the standard errors (Salvatore and 
Reagle, 2002:207).  If heteroskedasticity is found, using robust standard errors from 
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator provides correct 
estimates of the coefficient.  Each of the models in this analysis were initially found to 
have heteroskedasticity, therefore, the estimates were derived using White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator.   
 
Overall DoD and Service Results 
 A comparison of the results for the overall DoD model and each of the service 
models, lagging downsizing for one and two years, is shown in Table 5.  As you can see, 
downsizing is statistically significant in all models, except lagging for one year in the 
Marine Corps model (USMC).  Additionally, the model specification appears to explain a 
majority of the variation in attrition rates for the overall DoD, the Air Force (USAF), the 
Navy (USN), and the USMC.  The explanation in variation of attrition rates is 
approximately half for the Army (USA).  The R^2 is highest for the USAF and is the 
lowest for the USA using both model specifications.  Furthermore, the downsizing effect 
is greatest for the USAF and the least for the USMC.  In fact, downsizing is not 
statistically significant when lagging downsizing for one year in the USMC model, and 
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appears to decrease attrition rates in the USMC when lagging for two years, which is the 
opposite effect expected.  The DoD models and each of the service models is explained in 
more detail in the following sections.   
 
Table 5.  Comparison of Models for Downsizing Effect 






DZ lagged One Year 
Overall DoD 0.848133 -0.288043 *** 
Army 0.531676 -0.279141 *** 
Air Force 0.730472 -0.378201 *** 
Navy 0.700271 -0.339068 *** 
Marine Corps 0.715498 -0.088753 Not significant 
DZ  lagged Two Years 
Overall DoD 0.839171 -0.251769 ** 
Army 0.440903 -0.174512 ** 
Air Force 0.753328 -0.370313 *** 
Navy 0.691687 -0.343389 *** 
Marine Corps 0.720966 0.369769 *** 
      
***significant to the 0.001 level, **0.05 level, *0.10 level 
 
 The overall DoD model, lagging downsizing for one and two years (Tables 6 and 
7), explain a majority of the variation in attrition rates for the DoD (0.848133 and 
0.839171 respectively).  Downsizing was a statistically significant variable in lagging one 
year to the 0.001 level and to the 0.05 level when lagging two years.  This indicates that 
if downsizing occurs, attrition rates will increase for both one and two years following 
the downsizing action (since the dataset portrays downsizing rates as negative numbers, 
multiplying the negative coefficient would garner an increase in attrition rates).  The 
control variables sl, raise, and misery are also statistically significant for each overall 
DoD model and indicate if stop-loss is enacted, the attrition rates will go down; if the 
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military pay raise is higher than the ECI, attrition will go down; and surprisingly, if the 
misery index increases, attrition rates will up.  The magnitude, however, is very small for 
each of these control variables.  Additionally, there is no autocorrelation present, as 
evidenced by the Durbin-Watson statistic.     
 
Table 6.  DoD Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 112 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-1) -0.288043 0.062932 -4.577052 0.0000 
RAISE -0.001608 0.000660 -2.435672 0.0166 
SL -0.023692 0.005102 -4.643368 0.0000 
MISERY 0.003384 0.000405 8.345285 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.124402 0.125055 -0.994779 0.3222 
AR(2) 0.109484 0.057022 1.920034 0.0577 
AR(3) 0.115962 0.073217 1.583816 0.1164 
R-squared 0.848133     Mean dependent var 0.166922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.833097     S.D. dependent var 0.036065 
S.E. of regression 0.014734     Sum squared resid 0.021926 
Log likelihood 319.2402     F-statistic 56.40563 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.087875     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Table 7.  DoD Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 112 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-2) -0.251769 0.079863 -3.152503 0.0021 
RAISE -0.002301 0.000731 -3.147853 0.0022 
SL -0.018781 0.005491 -3.420243 0.0009 
MISERY 0.003837 0.000401 9.559277 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.091605 0.092918 0.985864 0.3265 
AR(2) -0.025173 0.093172 -0.270182 0.7876 
R-squared 0.839171     Mean dependent var 0.166922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.824980     S.D. dependent var 0.036065 
S.E. of regression 0.015088     Sum squared resid 0.023220 
Log likelihood 316.0293     F-statistic 59.13487 




For the Army, where downsizing was lagged one and two years (Tables 8 and 9), 
the overall model explains 0.531676 and 0.440903 of the variation in attrition rates.  The 
downsizing variable is significant at better than the 0.001 level and has a magnitude of -
0.279141 when lagging downsizing for one year, meaning that if the service downsizes, 
one year later, attrition rates will increase by 0.279141, the second lowest of any of the 
service models.  When lagging downsizing for two years, attrition rates still increase 
when the service downsizes, but the magnitude decreases.  Each of the variables are 
statistically significant and indicate if the military pay raise were higher than the ECI, 
attrition rates would go down; if stop-loss were implemented, attrition rates would 
decrease, and if the economy worsens, attrition rates would go up.  As with the overall 
DoD, the economy proxy results are in the opposite direction expected.  Additionally, the 
coefficient magnitudes for the control variables are small.  Finally, the residuals do not 
indicate autocorrelation. 
Table 8.  Army Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005 
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-1) -0.279141 0.059370 -4.701745 0.0000 
RAISE -0.003718 0.000430 -8.647175 0.0000 
SL -0.021612 0.007487 -2.886478 0.0048 
MISERY 0.002985 0.000382 7.816072 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.367946 0.148338 -2.480458 0.0148 
AR(2) 0.018166 0.080002 0.227069 0.8208 
AR(3) 0.188818 0.066388 2.844153 0.0054 
R-squared 0.531676     Mean dependent var 0.179139 
Adjusted R-squared 0.485307     S.D. dependent var 0.023979 
S.E. of regression 0.017203     Sum squared resid 0.029890 
Log likelihood 301.8876     F-statistic 11.46626 





Table 9.  Army Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005 
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ_USA(-2) -0.174512 0.084871 -2.056209 0.0423 
RAISE -0.003793 0.000577 -6.574748 0.0000 
SL -0.020384 0.005807 -3.510104 0.0007 
MISERY 0.003423 0.000486 7.044326 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.059845 0.102569 -0.583461 0.5609 
AR(2) -0.046522 0.123930 -0.375387 0.7082 
R-squared 0.440903     Mean dependent var 0.179139 
Adjusted R-squared 0.391571     S.D. dependent var 0.023979 
S.E. of regression 0.018704     Sum squared resid 0.035684 
Log likelihood 291.9665     F-statistic 8.937449 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.190135     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
The USAF models explain the highest amount of the variation in attrition rates of 
the individual services (Tables 10 and 11).  Additionally, the coefficient magnitudes for 
downsizing are the greatest of any of the service models.  As with the overall DoD and 
the USA already discussed, the control variables each have a small magnitude and each 
have the same effect.   Autocorrelation is not present in either model. 
Table 10.  Air Force Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005 
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-1) -0.378201 0.023041 -16.41411 0.0000 
RAISE -0.001323 0.000415 -3.190566 0.0019 
SL -0.028672 0.003756 -7.632850 0.0000 
MISERY 0.003822 0.000141 27.04195 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.509143 0.081217 -6.268886 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.122168 0.086100 -1.418906 0.1590 
AR(3) -0.071024 0.115804 -0.613317 0.5410 
R-squared 0.730472     Mean dependent var 0.125082 
Adjusted R-squared 0.703786     S.D. dependent var 0.020517 
S.E. of regression 0.011166     Sum squared resid 0.012593 
Log likelihood 350.2926     F-statistic 27.37286 




Table 11.  Air Force Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005 
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-2) -0.370313 0.025999 -14.24313 0.0000 
RAISE -0.003004 0.000469 -6.409207 0.0000 
SL -0.024303 0.004033 -6.026603 0.0000 
MISERY 0.003647 0.000139 26.27523 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.221376 0.091135 -2.429110 0.0169 
AR(2) -0.452157 0.109837 -4.116629 0.0001 
R-squared 0.753328     Mean dependent var 0.125082 
Adjusted R-squared 0.731562     S.D. dependent var 0.020517 
S.E. of regression 0.010630     Sum squared resid 0.011525 
Log likelihood 355.2549     F-statistic 34.61155 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.077051     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
In the USN models (Tables 12 and 13), the explanatory power of the models are 
the third highest of any of the service models and the downsizing effect is the second 
highest, only slightly behind the downsizing effect on attrition rates in the USAF.  The 
misery index and the stop-loss variable react as in each of the previously discussed 
models; however, the coefficient for the military pay raise variable is not statistically 
significant when lagging downsizing for one year.   
Table 12.  Navy Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005 
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-1) -0.339068 0.047570 -7.127820 0.0000 
RAISE 0.000768 0.000588 1.307929 0.1939 
SL -0.024152 0.003288 -7.345464 0.0000 
MISERY 0.002521 0.000782 3.221774 0.0017 
AR(1) 0.118319 0.117284 1.008826 0.3155 
AR(2) 0.207791 0.084774 2.451114 0.0160 
AR(3) 0.109329 0.142735 0.765958 0.4455 
R-squared 0.700271     Mean dependent var 0.160540 
Adjusted R-squared 0.670595     S.D. dependent var 0.020421 
S.E. of regression 0.011721     Sum squared resid 0.013875 
Log likelihood 344.8660     F-statistic 23.59714 




Table 13.  Navy Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005 
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-2) -0.343389 0.061282 -5.603387 0.0000 
RAISE -0.001193 0.000684 -1.743969 0.0842 
SL -0.013204 0.003055 -4.321844 0.0000 
MISERY 0.003918 0.000374 10.46449 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.321531 0.100355 3.203924 0.0018 
AR(2) -0.040033 0.095149 -0.420738 0.6748 
R-squared 0.691687     Mean dependent var 0.160540 
Adjusted R-squared 0.664483     S.D. dependent var 0.020421 
S.E. of regression 0.011829     Sum squared resid 0.014272 
Log likelihood 343.2847     F-statistic 25.42582 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.908696     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The Marine Corps models (Tables 14 and 15) are much different than the other 
services.  The explanatory power of the models are similar when lagging downsizing for 
both one and two years (0.715498 versus 0.720966); however, downsizing is not 
statistically significant when lagging downsizing for one year, and when lagging for two 
years, attrition rates appear to decrease.   Additionally, stop-loss is not statistically 
significant in either model.  Neither model exhibits autocorrelation.   
Table 14.  Marine Corps Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005 
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-1) -0.088753 0.089864 -0.987626 0.3257 
RAISE -0.001133 0.000539 -2.101747 0.0381 
SL -0.006244 0.005047 -1.237263 0.2189 
MISERY 0.001185 0.000679 1.744628 0.0841 
AR(1) 0.457836 0.085603 5.348336 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.067265 0.061223 -1.098686 0.2745 
AR(3) 0.261464 0.051907 5.037172 0.0000 
R-squared 0.715498     Mean dependent var 0.202927 
Adjusted R-squared 0.687329     S.D. dependent var 0.022883 
S.E. of regression 0.012795     Sum squared resid 0.016536 
Log likelihood 335.0386     F-statistic 25.40062 







Table 15.  Marine Corps Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years 
Dependent Variable: ATTR 
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005 
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DZ(-2) 0.369769 0.065268 5.665372 0.0000 
RAISE -0.001370 0.000447 -3.064167 0.0028 
SL -0.005699 0.005994 -0.950757 0.3440 
MISERY 0.001732 0.000619 2.797006 0.0062 
AR(1) 0.580436 0.075418 7.696253 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.161774 0.046049 3.513068 0.0007 
R-squared 0.720966     Mean dependent var 0.202927 
Adjusted R-squared 0.696345     S.D. dependent var 0.022883 
S.E. of regression 0.012610     Sum squared resid 0.016218 
Log likelihood 336.1253     F-statistic 29.28291 




 This chapter presented the results of the analysis in attempting to answer the 
question of how downsizing affects attrition rates across the DoD.  Additionally, post-
estimating testing was discussed to offer validity of the results.  As noted, downsizing 
appears to affect attrition rates when lagging downsizing for one year in the overall DoD 
and in each of the services except the USMC.  When lagging downsizing for two years, 
the USMC is also very different than the other models in that downsizing appears to 
decrease attrition rates.  In the next chapter, the overall findings are discussed further and 






V. Conclusions  
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will address the overall findings of the analysis and provide answers 
to the questions posed in Chapter One.  Additionally, possible implications of the 
analysis will be offered.  Finally, this chapter will offer suggestions for future research in 
the context of downsizing in the DoD.   
 
Research Questions Answered 
 At the onset of this research, the question was posed: “How does downsizing 
affect attrition rates in the DoD?”  Additionally, the answer was sought for whether or not 
these effects mirror the civilian sector as far as increased turnover duration due to 
downsizing, where civilian affects appear to return to normal after approximately one 
year, as found by Allen and others in their 2001 study.     
 Downsizing generally appears to affect attrition rates in the DoD.  The overall 
DoD model indicated the model was a very good fit in explaining attrition rates (see 
Table 16).  The service models, except for the USMC and USA models, indicate similar 
results.  Moreover, the downsizing variable was strongly statistically significant for all 
models except the USMC one year after the downsizing action and for the overall DoD, 
the USAF, and the USN, results were strong two years after a downsizing action as well.  
The effect appears strongest in the USAF for both one and two years following a 
downsizing action, as the coefficients are the highest.  The USN followed a very close 
second in coefficient magnitude.  Interesting to note is that the USMC showed the lowest 
effect one year following downsizing, though the result was not statistically significant.  
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Additionally, of the other services where downsizing was statistically significant one year 
following a downsizing action, the USA had the lowest magnitude of effect in attrition 
rates based on downsizing.  Moreover, the USMC showed that two years following a 
downsizing action, their attrition rates actually decrease.   
Table 16.  Summary of Overall Results 
Service R^2 DZ   Raise   SL   Misery   















0.022(0.007) ** 0.003(0.000) ***





















0.006(0.005)  0.001(0.001) * 















0.020(0.006) *** 0.003(0.000) ***





















0.006(0.006)  0.002(0.001) ** 
            
***significant to the 0.001 level, **0.05 level, *0.10 level   
 
 In general, the models showed the economic condition proxy, the misery index, 
behaving in the opposite direction expected.  That is, according to the results, if the 
economy worsens, attrition rates will increase, though, as with the other control variables, 
the magnitude is very small.  This is perhaps because the data captured aggregate attrition 
rates and aggregate national economic conditions, not broken down by employment 
classification/career specialty of individuals or economic conditions in the locality where 
the service member would relocate (perhaps their original home of record or where they 
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might have received a job offer).  Additionally, individuals may have separated from the 
service for reasons other than general national economic conditions.  Finally, because of 
the unusually high misery index of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the results of this 
variable’s coefficient could have been affected.     
While the military pay raise exceeding the ECI was statistically significant for the 
overall DoD, the USA, the USAF, and the USMC, the USN results were not for one year 
following a downsizing action, but increased in statistical significance two years 
following a downsizing action.  This is perhaps due to the special pays USN personnel 
receive that are different than the other services.  For example, submarine pay can range 
from $75 to $425 per month and sea pay can be as high as $750 per month, each of which 
can be received in addition to one’s basic pay and allowances.  Still, after two years, the 
pay raise for USN personnel becomes statistically significant in line with the other 
services.   
Finally, stop-loss was not statistically significant for the USMC, but was for each 
of the other services.  After speaking with a USMC representative from Public Affairs, 
this is perhaps because the USMC does not use stop-loss as a policy as widely or 
extensively as some of the other services.  Still, the variable’s coefficient, while not 
statistically significant, was of the correct sign, meaning stop-loss being implemented 
would slightly reduce attrition rates.     
Implications 
 For the USAF and the USN, downsizing appears to have a much stronger effect 
that lasts longer than in the USA or the USMC.  This is perhaps due to the mission 
differences among the services.  The USAF and USN are more “business-like” in their 
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organizations and daily environment, whereas the USA and USMC are less like the 
corporate world in their execution and mission.  This is evidenced by the fact that there 
are more career fields in the USA and the USMC that are combat arms, whereas the 
USAF and the USN have limited combat arms-related specialties.  The results indicate 
there are institutional differences within each of the services that appear to influence 
attrition rates differently.   
 Important to note as a result of this analysis is that the magnitudes of the effect of 
downsizing, while statistically significant in most cases, are not extremely large, but may 
have significant longer-term effects.  As an example, if overall downsizing for a service 
is 6% or approximately 20,000 personnel (as in the case of the USAF’s present Force 
Shaping initiative for fiscal year 2007), their attrition rates would increase by 2.23% or 
approximately 7.9K personnel in fiscal year 2008 and 2.22% or approximately 7.3K 
personnel in fiscal year 2009 based on the results of this study.  However, as discussed 
previously, unexpected turnover has been estimated to cost between $75,000 and 
$186,000 per departing employee, perhaps even more in the military due to the extensive 
training members must complete.    For the USAF, based on the results of this study, the 
effect of the downsizing action in fiscal year 2007 could cost between $592,500,000 and 
$1,469,400,000 in fiscal year 2008 and $547,500,000 and $1,357,800,000 in fiscal year 
2009 due to turnover costs from unexpected turnover.  While the DoD’s estimated budget 
for fiscal year 2008 and 2009 are $485B and $505B respectively, and the additional cost 
of up to $1.469B for the USAF’s possible dysfunctional turnover in fiscal year 2008 
alone amounts to less than one percent of the entire budget, these are costs the DoD 
should consider, along with the proposed savings from cutting the positions, since 
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budgets are dwindling and the need for modernization of weapons systems is upon us 
(DoD-b, 2006:V-7).  Another important issue to consider is that the service could lose 
some of its “more productive or valued” employees in the 7.9K additional departures 
because of role overload and lack of role clarity due to additional loss of personnel, 
which could stifle the mission of many organizations. The assumption that these “more 
valuable” employees would be retained (to make the restructuring following the 
downsizing effective), and only those the service terminated or those who volunteered to 
leave actually departed the organization, would be flawed based on the empirical studies 
from the civilian sector.  In sum, while the magnitudes achieved during this analysis are 
not extremely large, long term effects could be substantial, as evidenced in the empirical 
studies discussed previously and in the dollarized cost of possible dysfunctional turnover 
of military personnel based on the results of this analysis.      
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 To enhance the research that was accomplished in this effort, four suggestions are 
offered.  First, a study could be conducted by following military personnel through a 
downsizing action by conducting an initial survey at the start or during a downsizing 
action (perhaps of the Air Force in their fiscal year 2007-2011 Force Shaping efforts of a 
40,000 personnel reduction) to gauge intent to turnover on an individual basis because of 
the downsizing action.  Furthermore, the results of the survey could be tracked through a 
review of personnel records at one year and two years following the action to determine 
if the intent to turnover as collected through the survey related to actual turnover of the 
individuals surveyed.  Because the military has service commitments as discussed 
 34
 
previously, the research would most likely cover a longer time period than is afforded 
during our tenure at AFIT; however, such a study might offer more insight for the DoD in 
determining whether or not to downsize, or perhaps, what might be done to mitigate 
costly dysfunctional, or unplanned, turnover following future and possibly fiscally-
required downsizing actions.  Second, because the motivation to depart the service may 
differ for officers and enlisted members, a researcher could look at the effects of 
downsizing on attrition rates for these categories.  Third, because public perception and 
ultimately the morale of military members has fluctuated over the years from anti-war 
sediments of the Vietnam era to the patriotic support of the post 9/11 time frame, and 
back again, another researcher could study the time varying effects of such public 
perceptions on attrition rates.  Finally, as the results showed differences in the effects of 
downsizing among the services (recall from the results that the USA had a much lower 
effect than did the USAF or the USN and the USMC result for downsizing being lagged 
one year was not statistically significant and two years after a downsizing action, attrition 
was shown to decrease), another researcher could try to determine the reasons for 
departures from the USA and the USMC and determine why these reasons might be 
different than in the USAF or the USN.   
 
Chapter Summary 
As presented in this study, downsizing generally appears to affect attrition rates in 
the DoD.  The effect lasts longer than in the civilian sector for most services, perhaps due 
to the service commitment incurred by members.  While the magnitude of the effect is 
not extremely large, implications of the effects could be strong and long-lasting for the 
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services.  Based on the results of this analysis and the dollarized implications of 
downsizing actions, this research has offered one form of insight to DoD leadership to 
incorporate into their decision making process when considering downsizing actions 
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Appendix B –Stationarity Tests-Augmented Dicky Fuller  
 
As shown below in each of the models, the null hypotheses for unit root were rejected.  
The data is stationary. 
 
Table 17.  DoD Overall 
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_DoD) has a unit root 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.222675  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
 
Table 18.  USA Overall 
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USA) has a unit root 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.293860  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
 
Table 19.  USAF Overall 
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USAF) has a unit root 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.534385  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
 
Table 20.  USN Overall 
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USN) has a unit root 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.931330  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
 
Table 21.  USMC Overall 
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USMC) has a unit root 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.471194  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  






Appendix C – Durbin-Watson Critical Values 
 
 To determine autocorrelation, if the Durbin-Watson statistic (d) ranges from zero 
to the lower limit (L) of d on the chart below, there is positive autocorrelation; if it is 
between the L and the upper (U) limits, autocorrelation is neither accepted nor rejected; if 
it is between the U and 4 minus U, there is no autocorrelation; if it is between 4 minus U 
and 4 minus L, autocorrelation is neither accepted nor rejected; if it is between 4 minus L 
to 4, there is negative autocorrelation.   
 
Table 22.  Durbin-Watson Critical Values (α=5%, n 6-200) 
k = l  k = 2  k = 3  k = 4  k = 5  
n  
dL dU dL dU dL dU dL dU dL dU
10 0.88 1.32 0.70 1.64 0.53 2.02 0.38 2.41 0.24 2.82 
15 1.08 1.36 0.95 1.54 0.82 1.75 0.69 1.97 0.56 2.21 
20 1.20 1.41 1.10 1.54 1.00 1.68 0.90 1.83 0.79 1.99 
25 1.29 1.45 1.21 1.55 1.12 1.66 1.04 1.77 0.95 1.89 
30 1.35 1.49 1.28 1.57 1.21 1.65 1.14 1.74 1.07 1.83 
35 1.40 1.52 1.34 1.58 1.28 1.65 1.22 1.73 1.16 1.80 
40 1.44 1.54 1.39 1.60 1.34 1.66 1.29 1.72 1.23 1.79 
45 1.48 1.57 1,43 1.62 1.38 1.67 1.34 1.72 1.29 1.78 
50 1.50 1.59 1.46 1.63 1.42 1.67 1.38 1.72 1.34 1.77 
55 1.53 1.60 1.49 1.64 1.45 1.68 1.41 1.72 1.38 1.77 
60 1.55 1.62 1.51 1.65 1.48 1.69 1.44 1.73 1.41 1.77 
65 1.57 1.63 1.54 1.66 1.50 1.70 1.47 1.73 1.44 1.77 
70 1.58 1.64 1.55 1.67 1.52 1.70 1.49 1.74 1.46 1.77 
75 1.60 1.65 1.57 1.68 1.54 1.71 1.51 1.74 1.49 1.77 
80 1.61 1.66 1.59 1.69 1.56 1.72 1.53 1.74 1.51 1.77 
85 1.62 1.67 1.60 1.70 1.57 1.72 1.55 1.75 1.52 1.77 
90 1.63 1.68 1.61 1.70 1.59 1.73 1.57 1.75 1.54 1.78 
95 1.64 1.69 1.62 1.71 1.60 1.73 1.58 1.75 1.56 1.78 
100 1.65 1.69 1.63 1.72 1.61 1.74 1.59 1.76 1.57 1.78 
Where n = number of observations and k = number of independent variables 
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Table 23.  Durbin-Watson Critical Values (Continued) 
k = 6  k = 7  k = 8  k = 9  k = 10  
n  
dL dU dL dU dL dU dL dU dL dU
15 0.45 2.47 0.34 2.73 0.25 2.98 0.18 3.22 0.11 3.44 
20 0.69 2.16 0.60 2.34 0.50 2.52 0.42 2.70 0.34 2.89 
25 0.87 2.01 0.78 2.14 0.70 2.28 0.62 2.42 0.54 2.56 
30 1.00 1.93 0.93 2.03 0.85 2.14 0.78 2.25 0.71 2.36 
35 1.10 1.88 1.03 1.97 0.97 2.05 0.91 2.14 0.85 2.24 
40 1.18 1.85 1.12 1.92 1.06 2.00 1.01 2.07 0.95 2.15 
45 1.24 1.84 1.19 1.90 1.14 1.96 1.09 2.02 1.04 2.09 
50 1.29 1.82 1.25 1.88 1.20 1.93 1.16 1.99 1.11 2.04 
55 1.33 1.81 1.29 1.86 1.25 1.91 1.21 1.96 1.17 2.01 
60 1.37 1.81 1.34 1.85 1.30 1.89 1.26 1.94 1.22 1.98 
65 1.40 1.81 1.37 1.84 1.34 1.88 1.30 1.92 1.27 1.96 
70 1.43 1.80 1.40 1.84 1.37 1.87 1.34 1.91 1.31 1.95 
75 1.46 1.80 1.43 1.83 1.40 1.87 1.37 1.90 1.34 1.94 
80 1.48 1.80 1.45 1.83 1.43 1.86 1.40 1.89 1.37 1.93 
85 1.50 1.80 1.47 1.83 1.49 1.86 1.42 1.89 1.40 1.92 
90 1.52 1.80 1.49 1.83 1.47 1.85 1.45 1.88 1.42 1.91 
95 1.54 1.80 1.51 1.83 1.49 1.85 1.46 1.88 1.44 1.90 
100 1.55 1.80 1.53 1.83 1.50 1.85 1.48 1.87 1.46 1.90 
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